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PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS AT THE WTO AND UNDER 
NAFfA CHAPTER 19: WHITHER THE DOCTRINE OF 
EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN 
DSU REFORM? 
KEVIN C. KENNEDY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Initially hailed as the "crown jewel" of the Uruguay Round and 
the "linchpin" of the World Trade Organization (WTO) multilat-
eral trading system,l it is now widely acknowledged that the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)2 needs revision. At the 
Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, trade ministers 
issued the following statement regarding negotiations on DSU 
reform: 
We agree to negotiations on improvements and clarifications of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The negotiations 
should be based on the work done thus far as well as any addi-
tional proposals by Members, and aim to agree on improve-
ments and clarifications not later than May 2003, at which time 
we will take steps to ensure that the results enter into force as 
soon as possible thereafter.3 
Even before the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference, a formal 
review of the DSU had begun in late 1997 pursuant to a 1994 Uru-
guay Round ministerial decision to review the DSU within four 
years after it entered into force. 4 That review, however, ultimately 
* Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Trade in the Americas, Michigan State 
University College of Law. LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School; J.D. 1977, Wayne State Uni-
versity; B.A. 1973, University of Michigan. 
1. See, e.g.,John Ragosta et aI., ltTO Dispute Settlement: the System is Flawed and Must Be 
Fixed, 37 INT'L LAw. 697, 697 (2003); Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International 
Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 845, 856 (1999). 
2. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter DSUj. 
3. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/ 
MIN(OI)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746, 751 (2002). 
4. See WTO Ministerial Conference, Decision on the Application and Review of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, in THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL 
TEXTS 465 (World Trade Org. ed., 1994). 
47 
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"sputtered to an end on July 30, 2003, without reaching any 
conclusions. "5 
It remains unclear whether future amendments to the DSU, if 
any, will consist of some modest fine-tuning or an ambitious over-
hau1.6 There are numerous suggestions and proposals for DSU 
reform-most from WTO Members, others from interested 
observers.7 
The DSU, both as drafted and as interpreted by WTO panels and 
the Appellate Body, has also been the subject of broad criticism 
when it comes to the absence of rules on judicial restraint.8 Com-
mentators have criticized the DSU's legal void as to rules governing 
standing to bring a complaint (other than that the complaining 
party must be a WTO Member9 ), on mootness (with post-complaint 
events not rendering a dispute moot if the panel's terms of refer-
ence have been issued lO), on ripeness (with panels in effect render-
5. William J. Davey, Reforming wro Dispute Settlement, in WTO AND EAST AsiA: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES 98 (Mitsuo Matsushita & Dukgeun Ahn eds., 2004). 
6. As Professor WilliamJ. Davey notes, "[e]ven after more than a year of discussions 
[in 2002-03], there were still disagreements being aired [among the WTO Members] over 
whether the aim of the negotiations should be relatively limited or not." Id. at l02; see also 
wro Members Still Stalled on DSU Changes One Month before Deadline, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 
25, 2003, at 7, 7 (noting the division among countries on the substance of proposed 
changes). 
7. See infra Appendix (providing a summary of proposed DSU reforms). 
8. See, e.g., William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System l!.xceeded its Author-
ity?, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 79, 96 (2001) (noting that the WTO system makes more use of 
"issue-avoidance" techniques, such as mootness, ripeness, and the exercise of judicial econ-
omy, in order to dispose of cases where a decision seems unnecessary); Ragosta, supra note 
l, at 730 ("In practice, WTO dispute settlement lacks basic jurisdictional limitations that 
restrain judicial activism."). 
9. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 1[ 133, WT IDS27 1 AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) (rejecting the EC's 
position that there is a "general rule that in all international litigation, a complaining party 
must have a 'legal interest' in order to bring a case"); EDMOND MCGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE REGULATION § 2.2324 (1995) (noting that the standing concept "has found little 
place in WTO law"); J. Patrick Kelly,Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization: Develop-
ing Principles of Self-Restraint, 22 Nw. J. INT'L TRADE & Bus. 353, 386 (2002) ("In the EC 
Bananas case the AB wisely rejected the 'legal interest' requirement for standing to sue 
articulated by the International Court of Justice and instead developed a more liberal 
approach that permits each member considerable discretion in deciding whether to bring 
an action."); Rodrigo Bustamante, The Need for a GATT Doctrine of Locus Standi: Why the 
United States Cannot Stand the European Community's Banana Import Regime, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 533, 535 (1997) (arguing for a doctrine of standing under the DSU). But see Peter 
Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195, 1210 
(1998) ("[I]n future cases, panels may have discretion to reject claims brought by Members 
with little or no stake in the proceedings, although the parameters of any such standing 
doctrine are unclear at this point."). 
10. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw: THE EVOLU-
TION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 262 (1993) ("The reason for wanting a ruling in 
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ing advisory opinions in cases where there is no live controversyll), 
and on the doctrine of non liquet12 (where panels should decline to 
such cases is usually the concern that the same measure will be repeated in the future; 
ruling after the fact is one of the only ways GAIT can deal with short-term GAIT 
violations.") . 
II. The doctrine of ripeness is rooted in U.S. constitutional law but finds no direct 
counterpart in customary international law. In the context of dispute settlement at the 
WTO, the ripeness doctrine has been analogized to the mandatory/discretionary distinc-
tion that has developed in GAIT /WTO jurisprudence. One commentator notes: 
[T]he mandatory/discretionary doctrine in GAIT/WTO law is sometimes com-
pared to the "ripeness" doctrine under the US constitutional law. The ripeness 
doctrine addresses the question of when judicial decisions can be rendered, pro-
viding that in order for courts to render judicial decisions, there should be a "case 
or controversy" in contrast to a hypothetical question. The purpose of the doc-
trine is to restrain courts from rendering decisions in the absence of "a genuine 
need" to resolve a dispute, and the underlying concern here is to avoid lawmak-
ing by courts and to maintain a proper relationship between the judiciary and 
other organs of the government. Similar to the ripeness doctrine, the 
mandatory/discretionary doctrine in GAIT /WTO law indicates that when a law is 
mandatory, a complaint involves the genuine need for decision, and thus, a dis-
pute is ripe, but when a law is discretionary, a dispute is not yet ripe. 
Yoshiko Naiki, The Mandatory/Discretionary Doctrine in wro Law: The US-Section 301 Case and 
Its Aftennath, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 23, 26 (2004) (footnotes omitted); see also Sharif Bhuiyan, 
Mandatory and Discretionary Legislation: The Continued Relevance of the Distinction Under the 
wro, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 571, 571-72 (2002) (noting that mandatory legislation requires 
the executive authority of a Member to act in a given matter, while discretionary legislation 
gives the executive discretion in how to act). Another scholar notes: 
If cases are considered ripe simply because a measure has the potential to create a 
violation, is this conclusion tantamount to abandoning any ripeness requirement? 
No, although the WTO test is less demanding than is the ripeness test under U.S. 
law. Under the WTO, a measure will not be ripe for review if the Member retains 
discretion to promulgate or interpret the law or regulation in a manner consis-
tent with its obligations - i.e., if the violation is not "mandatory" under any given 
circumstances. But as long as a measure will necessarily result in a violation 
under some circumstances, a Member need not wait for those circumstances to 
arise. 
Lichtenbaum, supra note 9, at 1214-15. See Panel Report, Argentina - Measures Affecting 
Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, , 6.45, WT /DS56/R (Nov. 25, 1997) 
(rejecting Argentina's argument that the case should not be considered because it only 
addressed a potential violation because the measures constituted mandatory measures), 
affd by Appellate Body Report, Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, 
Apparel and Other Items, WT /DS56/ AB/R (Mar. 27, 1998). 
12. See generally Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the wro: Discursive, Consti-
tutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 258, 260 (2004). According to 
Steinberg: 
[V]arious customary doctrines counsel abstention in dealing with a gap in the 
law. Some would invoke the doctrine of non liquet (which means "it is not clear") 
if the law does not permit deciding a case one way or the other. According to that 
view, there are gaps in international law and it is not the place of courts to fill 
those gaps as they are not legislative organs; thus, in such cases courts should 
declare non liquet . ... The doctrine of non liquet has never been invoked by either 
a WTO panel or the Appellate Body to permit or excuse a member's behavior. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Charles Pierson, Preemptive Self-Defense in an Age of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 33 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 150, 172 (2004) ("A 
non liquet ('it is not clear') occurs when the legal norms in an area of the law are so inter-
nally contradictory or confused that we cannot articulate the law."); Lorand Bartels, The 
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rule in cases where the law is not clear).J3 Interestingly, among the 
various reform proposals advanced by WTO Members, there is not 
a single mention of making rules on judicial restraint-for exam~ 
Separation of Powers in the wro: How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 53 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 861, 
874-76 (2004) (discussing the use of non liquet in WTO dispute settlement proceedings); 
Jiaxiang Hu, The Role of International Law in the Development of wro Law, 7]. INT'L ECON. L. 
143,145 n.5 (2004) ("Only [matters left unregulated] would permit a panel or the Appel-
late Body to refuse jurisdiction on the basis of a non-liquet (i.e., issue not accessible to legal 
adjudication due to the absence of law on the matter or for other reasons such as political 
impediment)."); Charles H. Koch,Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH.]. INT'L L. 
1, 42 (2003) ("GATT and WTO examples of non liquets are the unadopted panel report in 
EEC Wheat f70ur txport Subsidies and the Coconuts case."). Kenya advanced a proposal to 
amend Article 3.2 of the DSU to add a variation of the doctrine of non liquet into WTO 
dispute settlement by including the following paragraph: 
When, in the course of proceedings before a panel or the Appellate Body, a ques-
tion arises on whether or not there is a conflict between provisions of any covered 
Agreement or between any covered Agreements, the panel or Appellate Body 
shall refer the matter to the General Council for a determination. In reaching 
the determination, the General Council may exercise the authority conferred 
under paragraph 2 of Art. IX of the WTO Agreement. 
Communication from Kenya, Text For the African Group Proposals on Dispute Settlement 
Understanding Negotiations, at 1, TN/DS/W/42 Gan. 24, 2003). A closely related doc-
trine to that of non liquet is the doctrine of in dubio mitius. Professor Steinberg explains: 
In dubio mitius is a well-established canon of treaty interpretation that attaches 
deference to state sovereignty when a mle is ambiguous: if a term is ambiguous, 
then the preferred meaning is the one t11at is the least onerous to the party 
assuming an obligation, or that interferes the least with the territorial and per-
sonal supremacy of a party, or that involves the fewest general restrictions on the 
parties. 
Steinberg, supra, at 258 (footnote omitted); see also James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Princi-
ples of International Law in the WID Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 248, 258 
(2001) (noting that in dubio mitius is "widely recognized as a supplementary means of inter-
pretation whereby deference is accorded to the sovereignty of the States"). 
13. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on 
Trade, Globalization and Reforming the wro, 8]. INT'L ECON. L. 329, 345 (2005) ("Effective 
use must be made of common judicial techniques that translate political sensitivities into 
legal results (such as deference, judicial minimalism, putting the burden of proving an 
obligation on the complainant and even declaring a non liquet)."). When national secur-
ity grounds are raised under GATT Article XXI as a defense to a WTO complaint, it has 
been suggested that something analogous to the political question doctrine be invoked by 
a WTO panel that reflects deference to the decision of the responding WTO Member. 
One commentator explains: 
Conceivably some matters of national security may resolve themselves by the time 
a WTO panel is prepared to mle on a dispute involving Article XXI. Similarly, 
although a panel is not likely to refuse to consider an Article XXI dispute because 
of a "political question" doctrine, issues involving political questions may cause a 
panel to extend greater deference to the decisions of respective WTO members 
than it otherwise might. 
Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATr Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?, 52 DUKE 
LJ. 1277, 1295 n.82 (2003) (citing William]. Davey, Has the W1D Dispute Settlement System 
f<.xceeded Its Authority? A Consideration of Deference Shown by the System to member Government 
Decisions and its Use of Issue-Avoidance Techniques, 4]. INT'L ECON. L. 79, 104-05 (2001)). 
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pIe, mootness, ripeness, and standing-a part of the WTO dispute 
setdemen t process.14 
Another rule of customary international law not currendy a can-
didate for DSU reform is the doctrine of exhaustion of local reme-
dies. Despite the potential reduction in the WTO caseload that 
application of the exhaustion doctrine could produce, the exhaus-
tion doctrine has, for some inexplicable reason, been ignored in 
the discussions on DSU reform. To put the exhaustion doctrine in 
WTO context, of the ninety-five original DSU proceedings result-
ing in a panel report as of September 2005, forty-three have 
involved disputes arising under either the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement (AD Agreement) 15 and/or the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).16 As explained 
below, both of these Agreements mandate judicial review of admin-
istrative determinations by national investigating authorities. In 
addition, in a number of instances, Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States have initiated WTO dispute setdement proceedings 
to challenge purported violations of the AD Agreement and/ or the 
SCM Agreement, while they and/or their nationals have simultane-
ously pursued resolution of the same disputed issues under the 
binational dispute setdement panel mechanism established under 
Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) P Parallel proceedings have been brought under 
14. See, e.g., Ragosta, supra note I, at 730 (noting the lack of standing, mootness, or 
ripeness doctrines); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 733, 
759 (1999) (suggesting that panels might resort to abstention doctrines comparable to the 
political question, ripeness, and standing doctrines). See generally Antonio F. Perez, The 
Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-Dialogic Abstention by the International Court of justice, 18 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 399 (1997) (canvassing doctrines of judicial abstention). 
15. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex lA, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
1125 [hereinafter AD Agreement]. 
16. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, Legal Instruments-Results of the 
Uruguay Round, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 LL.M. 1125 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
17. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 19, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
LL.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (providing for the establishment of binational 
panels). NAFTA Chapter 19 sets forth an alternative dispute settlement mechanism cre-
ated by Canada, Mexico, and the United States to resolve unfair trade remedy disputes. 
Article 1904 replaces judicial review of AD and CVD administrative determinations by 
national investigating authorities with binational panel review. Id. art. 1904.1. The law 
applied by binational panels is that of the country of importation. Id. art. 1904.2. The 
disputing countries select the persons who serve on the five-member panels from a roster 
of panelists. Id. annex 1901.2 (indicating that each party shall appoint two panelists in 
consultation with the other involved party and that the parties shall agree on the selection 
of a fifth panelist). The phenomenon of parallel WTO-Chapter 19 proceedings is not 
HeinOnline -- 39 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 52 2007
52 The Ceo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. [Vol. 39 
NAFTA Chapter 19 and to the WTO involving the following prod-
ucts: (1) Canadian exports to the United States of softwood lumber 
and wheat, (2) U.S. exports to Mexico of high-fructose corn syrup, 
and (3) Mexican exports to the United States of cement and oil-
country tubular goods. 18 
As Table XX in Appendix XX illustrates, all or most of the same 
legal issues were raised in these parallel proceedings. As noted by 
one commentator, "[i]n the WTO context, the exhaustion issue 
normally arises in challenges to formal administrative proceedings 
(e.g. antidumping, countervailing, or safeguards proceedings), 
although the exhaustion issue can also arise in other situations if 
the challenged Member contends that domestic judicial proce-
dures would have provided an adequate remedy."19 
Consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies, 
resort to the DSU should be foreclosed until all domestic review 
proceedings challenging a national investigating authority's impo-
sition of antidumping (AD) or countervailing (CVD) duties are 
exhausted, subject to the well-recognized grounds that excuse 
exhaustion.20 Given the supranational character of the NAFTA 
Chapter 19 dispute settlement mechanism for resolving AD and 
CVD disputes, the exhaustion doctrine should apply a fortiori, thus 
barring one NAFTA Party from bringing a complaint to the WTO 
against another NAFT A Party alleging a violation of the WTO AD 
or SCM Agreement until the NAFTA Chapter 19 process has run its 
course. 
unique to NAFTA. As shown in Table XX in Appendix XX, under the Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA), Canada initiated parallel proceedings under GATT 1947 involv-
ing both softwood lumber and pork from Canada, while FTA Chapter 19 binational dis-
pute settlement panel proceedings were also pending. See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Can., Dec. 22-23, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281, 386-95 (1988) (setting forth the 
provisions that govern the establishment of a binational panel under Chapter 19). 
18. See infra Appendix. On January 19, 2006, Mexico and the United States reached a 
settlement "in principle" to resolve the dispute over an antidumping order the United 
States imposed on imports of Mexican cement in 1990. U.S., Mexico Strike Cement Deal, As 
U.S. Rejects Changes to NAFI'A, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 20, 2006, at 1,1. A settlement of the 
Cement cases, both at the WTO and under NAFTA Chapter 19, was announced on January 
19, 2006. Pursuant to the agreement proposed in January, all litigation surrounding the 
cement antidumping case would cease, including a WTO panel brought by the Mexican 
government and a Chapter 19 challenge brought by Mexican cement exporters under 
NAFTA. Id. at 16. In March 2006, Mexico and the United States signed the proposed 
agreement, which took effect on April 3, 2006. Mexico Threatens to Replace HFCS Tax with 
New Duty After M'O Defeat, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 10, 2006, at 10, 10. The agreement 
resolved all litigation surrounding the antidumping order and took effect on April 3, 2006. 
Id. 
19. Lichtenbaum, suj.rra note 9, at 1220. 
20. See infra Part II. 
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This Article begins with an analysis of the doctrine of exhaustion 
of local remedies under customary international law. It then exam-
ines the status of the exhaustion doctrine at the WTO and under 
NAFTA. It concludes with two recommendations: (1) amend 
either the DSU or the AD and SCM Agreements to mandate 
exhaustion of local remedies in AD and CVD disputes, and (2) 
amend NAFT A Chapter 19 to provide for the automatic selection 
of panelists in the event a disputing country fails to appoint its pan-
elists within thirty days of a request for Chapter 19 panel review.21 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 
The doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies is well-recognized 
in international law. The commentary of the Restatement (Third) 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States indicates that "[u]nder 
international law, ordinarily a state is not required to consider a 
claim by another state for an injury to its national until that person 
has exhausted domestic remedies, unless such remedies are clearly 
sham or inadequate, or their application is unreasonably pro-
longed."22 A corollary is that the aggrieved national's home state 
may not initiate proceedings against the offending state in an inter-
national tribunal until local remedies have been exhausted. In the 
words of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), "[ t] he rule that 
local remedies must be exhausted before international proceed-
21. Decisions of NAFTA Chapter 19 binational panels are binding on the disputing 
parties, subject to review by an extraordinary challenge procedure. See NAFTA, supra note 
17, arts. 1904.9, 1904.13 (setting forth the limited situations in which a Party may avail itself 
of the extraordinary challenge procedure). There have been only three extraordinary 
challenges brought under NAFTA to date. All three of these challenges have been 
brought by the United States, and all of them have been unsuccessful. See In re Gray Port-
land Cement, Secretariat File No. ECC-2000-1904-01USA (Oct. 30, 2003) (rejecting, in the 
first extraordinary challenge under NAFTA, a request by the United States that an 
extraordinary challenge committee be convened to consider one of fourteen determina-
tions made by a binational panel regarding an antidumping order relating to gray portland 
cement and clinker from Mexico); In re Pure Magnesium from Canada, Secretariat File No. 
ECC-2003-1904-01USA (Oct. 7, 2004) (rejecting the challenge brought by the United 
States because although the binational panel exceeded its powers by failing to apply the 
correct standard of review, and such action did materially affect the panel's decision, the 
action by the panel did not threaten the integrity of the binational panel review process, as 
required under Article 1904.13 of NAFT A); In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from 
Canada, Secretariat File No. ECC-2004-1904-01USA (Aug. 10, 2005) (rejecting arguments 
made by the United States that the binational panel committed errors in resolving the 
softwood lumber dispute). 
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 713 cmt. f (1986); see also C.F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 
11-29 (1990) (discussing the history of the law relating to the local remedies nile). 
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ings may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary inter-
national law."23 
Traditionally, the rule of exhaustion of local remedies has been 
applied in cases of diplomatic protection. Typical claims stem 
from a foreign investor whose investment has been expropriated by 
a host state without payment of adequate compensation or from a 
victim of a human rights violation alleging violations of the mini-
mum standard of treatment of aliens under international law.24 
Failure to exhaust local remedies is thus a restriction on a nation's 
ability to espouse the claims of one of its nationals before another 
nation or an international tribunal. 25 
The core rationale of the exhaustion rule is opportunity to 
cure-"that the host or respondent State must be given the oppor-
tunity of redressing the alleged injury."26 As articulated by the Ie], 
"[b]efore resort may be had to an international court in such a 
situation, it has been considered necessary that the State where the 
violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its 
own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal sys-
tem."27 Although this exhaustion rule is primarily driven by a con-
23. Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.Cl 6, 27 (Mar. 21); see also Matthew H. Adler, 
Congressional Involvement in Expropriation Cases: A Case Study of the "FactJinding" Process, 21 
LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 211,214-15 (1989) ("It is a principle of international claims law 
that nationals of one state who claim injury at the hands of another must first exhaust their 
local remedies in the host state, unless they can demonstrate that the exercise would be 
futile."); Anuj Desai, Case No. A27: The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal's First Award of 
Damages for a Breach of the Algiers Declarations, 10 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 229, 236 (1999) ("Cus-
tomary international law is clear that, before a state can bring a claim in an international 
tribunal on behalf of one of its nationals, the i~ured party must be shown to have 
exhausted its local remedies in the host State."). 
24. See, e.g., A.A. CAN(,ADO TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION 
OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 3, 11 (1983) (discussing application of the local 
remedies rule in the context of human rights protection); David J. Scheffer, Non-judicial 
State Remedies and the jurisdiction of the International Court of justice, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 83, 90 
(1990) ("The rule typically is invoked in espousal cases, or cases where the national's gov-
ernment represents the national's interest in a claim against another target government."). 
25. See Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of 
the Calvo Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors, 26 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 1169, 
1191-92 (1995) (discussing that the exhaustion of local remedies requirement is recog-
nized as a restriction on diplomatic protection and "provides a barrier to requesting one's 
government to espouse a claim"). 
26. AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 97; see also id. at 61-62 ("The rule that local reme-
dies must be exhausted recognizes the defendant State's interests, by affording such State 
the opportunity to redress the wrong committed."). 
27. Interhandel, 1959 I.Cl at 27; see also EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PRO-
TEcrlON OF CITIZENS ABROAD 817 (1915) ("[T]he home government of the complaining 
citizen must give the offending government an opportunity of doing justice to the injured 
party in its own regular way, and thus avoid, if possible, all occasion for international 
discussion. "). 
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cern for the interests of the respondent state, the rule also serves 
both the interests of the home state of the injured alien and also 
the interests of international tribunals.28 First, "it relieve[s] 
national States of espousing claims that might be resolved at a 
lower level or which [are] unfounded and frivolous."29 Second, it 
relieves "international tribunals from being excessively burdened 
with litigation."30 
In Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (the ELSI Case), a chamber of the IC] 
addressed whether the exhaustion doctrine applies when a state 
brings a proceeding against another state alleging a violation of 
treaty obligations owed to the former by the latter.31 The ELSI Case 
involved the interpretation of a 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce, and Navigation between the United States and Italy (the 
FCN Treaty).32 The United States alleged that Italy had violated 
the FCN Treaty by acts and omissions that deprived two U.S. corpo-
rations of their right to manage and control an Italian corporation 
they owned.33 Italy, invoking the exhaustion doctrine, argued that 
the U.S. corporations had failed to exhaust Italian domestic reme-
dies.34 The United States countered that, because its case before 
the IC] sought a declaratory judgment that the FCN Treaty had 
been violated, the claim was not one of espousal and therefore was 
not subject to the exhaustion doctrine. lI5 The United States also 
made the related argument that because it was seeking a declara-
tory judgment that Italy had violated the rights of the Government 
28. See William S. Dodge, National Courts and International Arbitration: l!.xhaustion of 
Remedies and Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 
357, 362 (2000). 
29. AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 67. 
30. Id. at 69; see also TRINDADE, supra note 24, at 3 ("[T]he rule was adopted ... to 
avoid the international organ being 'flooded' with irrelevant complaints."). 
31. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.CJ. 15,42 (July 20) (noting 
that the United States questioned whether the rule of exhaustion of local remedies could 
apply to a case brought under the treaty involved in the case). 
32. See id. Article XXVI of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN 
Treaty) provides as follows: 
Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or the 
application of this Treaty, which the High Contracting Parties shall not satisfacto-
rily adjust by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, 
unless the High Contracting Parties shall agree to settlement by some other 
pacific means. 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Italy, art. XXVI, Feb. 2, 1948, 63 
Stat. 2255. 
33. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), 1989 I.CJ. at 19-20. 
34. Id. at 42. 
35. See id. ("The United States further argued that the local remedies rule would not 
apply in any event to the part of the United States claim which requested a declaratory 
judgment finding that the FCN Treaty had been violated."). 
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of the United States under the FeN Treaty, thereby causing direct 
injury to the United States, the local remedies rule was inapplica-
ble.36 The Ie] chamber rejected these arguments, concluding that 
it was not possible "to find a dispute over [an] alleged violation of 
the FeN Treaty resulting in direct injury to the United States, that 
is both distinct from, and independent of, the dispute over the 
alleged violation in respect of Raytheon and Machlett [the 
aggrieved American companies]."37 Finding that the claim of the 
United States and that of the two American companies were inex-
tricably tied, the Ie] chamber rejected the argument that "there is 
a part of the Applicant's claim which can be severed so as to render 
the local remedies rule inapplicable to that part."38 In short, the 
Ie] chamber was unreceptive to what it apparently viewed as a 
hypertechnical argument that a state's rights under an FeN treaty 
are distinct from those of its aggrieved national. 
Although there is some support for the view that each domestic 
and international law claim potentially at issue in a case must be 
first presented to local tribunals in order to fully satisfy the local 
remedies rule,39 in the ELSI Case, the ICJ found that both domestic 
and international law claims need not be presented to local tribu-
nals in order to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine.4o Nevertheless, the 
exhaustion rule does require that the injured alien take all appeals 
and obtain a final decision from the highest court of the host State 
to which it has a right to resort.41 
A failure to exhaust local remedies may be excused when resort 
to local tribunals would be "clearly sham or inadequate, or their 
application is unreasonably prolonged."42 It is also possible to 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 42-43. 
38. Id. at 43. 
39. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 28, at 362 (citing authority for the proposition that 
suggests that "an if\iured alien must bring not just its domestic law claims but also its inter-
national claims before the domestic court"). 
40. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), 1989 I.e]. at 47-48. 
41. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 181 (" [T] he alien must proceed to the highest 
court in the total system ... where the legal system of the respondent or host State has a 
multiple hierarchy of fora which can provide redress"); see also Dodge, supra note 28, at 362 
("[Ilt is clear that the local remedies rule is not satisfied until the injured alien has com-
pletely exhausted its appeals and has obtained a final decision from the highest court of 
the host State to which it has a right to resort."). 
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TI-IE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 713 cmt. f (1986); see also AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 194 ("Where it is clear that the 
resort to an appeal or reference to another court or tribunal would not be a source of 
adequate redress, the alien is excused from spending his money and time."); BORCHARD, 
supra note 27, at 821-25 (discussing the qualifications on the rule that local remedies be 
exhausted); Dodge, supra note 28, at 362 ("Failure to exhaust local remedies may be 
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waive the exhaustion rule by treaty.43 As the ICJ chamber stated 
unequivocally in the ELSI Case, there can be "no doubt that the 
parties to a treaty can therein either agree that the local remedies 
rule shall not apply to claims based on alleged breaches of that 
treaty; or confirm that it shall apply."44 Whether a waiver must be 
stated explicidy in the treaty or whether it may be implied is not 
clear.45 In the ELSI Case, the United States argued that if the 
United States and Italy "had ... intended the jurisdiction con-
ferred upon the Court to be qualified by the local remedies rule in 
cases of diplomatic protection, [they] would have used express 
words to that effect."46 In rejecting this argument, the ICJ cham-
ber was clear that an implicit waiver of the local remedies rule was 
not possible, stating that it was "unable to accept that an important 
principle of customary international law should be held to have 
been tacidy dispensed with, in the absence of any words making 
clear an intention to do SO."47 On the strength of the ELSI Case, "it 
seems that simply providing for the settlement of disputes without 
any reference to domestic courts ... is insufficient to waive the 
local remedies rule."48 
excused only in limited circumstances."); Louis Sohn & Robert Baxter, Responsibility of 
States for Injuries to the &onomic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM.]. INT'L L. 545, 577 (1961) (indicat-
ing in a Draft Convention of the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens 
that the need to exhaust local remedies is excused where they are "excessively slow," or will 
not provide "substantial recovery," or have been foreclosed by an act or omission of the 
state). Instances where recourse to a domestic forum could be considered "obviously 
futile" include the following: 
(1) when recourse to the forum will result in the repetition of a clear line of 
direct precedent adverse to the claimant; (2) when the court has no jurisdiction 
over the issue; (3) when the respondent State's municipal law clearly justifies the 
acts complained of; (4) when the respondent State's judicial branch lacks inde-
pendence; (5) when the available remedies will not provide the relief sought by 
claimant; or, (6) when there is an absence of due process of law in the respon-
dent State. 
Desai, supra note 23, at 238. 
43. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 22, at 251-55 (discussing the possibility that express 
waiver of the requirement that local remedies be exhausted may be contained in treaties 
and do not raise any significant issues). 
44. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.CJ. 15,42 (July 20). 
45. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 28, at 363 (noting that although the requirement that 
local remedies be exhausted may be waived, it is unclear how explicit such a waiver must 
be). 
46. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) , 1989 I.CJ. at 42. 
47. Id. 
48. Dodge, supra note 28, at 365. In American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, however, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal read the Iran-U.S. Claims Settlement 
Declaration as waiving the local remedies rule by negative implication. See Am. Int'I 
Group, Inc. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 96,102 (1983) (noting that the Claims Settle-
ment Declaration "delimited the grounds for excluding claims from the Tribunal's juris.-
diction, and a general reservation for cases within the domestic jurisdiction of one the 
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III. EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES AT THE WTO 
One question that has arisen is whether the exhaustion doctrine 
applies in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. More specifically, 
does the exhaustion rule apply when an aggrieved WTO Member 
complains about a violation of the AD or SCM Agreement in state-
to-state WTO dispute settlement? The text of the DSU, the AD 
Agreement, and the SCM Agreement provide no clear guidance. 
A. The WTO Agreements 
First, Article 3.2 of the DSU notes that the DSU serves to clarify 
the existing provisions of various WTO agreements in accordance 
with the customary rules for interpreting public international law, 
but with no express mention of exhaustion or any of the other 
rules on judicial restraint.49 Article 3.7 of the DSU provides that 
before bringing a case, "a Member shall exercise its judgment as to 
whether action under these procedures would be fruitful. The aim 
of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution 
to a dispute."5o This provision hints at restraint, but restraint on 
the part of a complaining WTO Member, not on the part of the 
WTO dispute settlement panels or the Appellate Body. 
Second, Article 7.4 of the SCM Agreement apparently gives 
Members the unconditional right to refer a matter to the DSB for 
the establishment of a panel after consultations have been 
exhausted.51 The Article makes no mention of exhaustion of local 
countries was not among those grounds"); see also Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. Rep. 9, 11 (1981) (setting forth the jurisdiction of the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal). 
49. Article 3.2 of the DSU provides: 
The dispute settlement system of the MTO is a central element in providing 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members of the 
MTO recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members 
under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public inter-
national law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or dimin-
ish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. 
DSU, supra note 2, art. 3.2. 
50. [d. art. 3.7. 
51. Article 7.4 of the SCM Agreement provides as follows: 
If consultations do not result in a mutually agreed solution within 60 days, any 
Member party to such consultations may refer the matter to the DSB for the 
establishment of a panel, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish a 
panel. The composition of the panel and its terms of reference shall be estab-
lished within 15 days from the date when it is established. 
SCM Agreement, supra note 16, art. 7.4 (footnote omitted). 
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remedies, even though Articles 12.1 and 12.2 of the SCM Agree-
ment do provide exporting Members full rights of participation in 
national administrative proceedings.52 Significandy, Article 23 of 
the SCM Agreement provides in part that "[e]ach Member whose 
national legislation contains provisions on countervailing duty 
measures shall maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative tribu-
nals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review 
of administrative actions relating to final determinations and 
reviews of determinations."53 It is not a legal impossibility for a 
treaty to expressly mandate the establishment of domestic appel-
late review of administrative determinations without implicidy 
requiring exhaustion of that appellate process before WTO dispute 
setdement proceedings are brought. However, in the face of such 
clear language mandating the establishment of a local remedy, 
exhaustion of that remedy is likely required before resorting to the 
DSU.54 
In short, neither the DSU nor any of the relevant dispute setde-
ment provisions of the AD and SCM Agreements explicidy requires 
exhaustion of local remedies. Nevertheless, provisions of both the 
52. See id. art. 12.1 ("Interested Members and all interested parties in a countelVailing 
duty investigation shall be given notice of the information which the authorities require 
and ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence which they consider relevant in 
respect of the investigation in question."); id. art. 12.2: 
Interested Members and interested parties also shall have the right, upon justifi-
cation, to present information orally. Where such information is provided orally, 
the interested Members and interested parties subsequently shall be required to 
reduce such submissions to writing. Any decision of the investigating authorities 
can only be based on such information and arguments as were on the written 
record of this authority and which were available to interested Members and 
interested parties participating in the investigation, due account having been 
given to the need to protect confidential information. 
53. Id. art. 23. 
54. In parallel provisions, Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement gives Members the right 
to refer a matter to the DSB for the establishment of a panel if final agency action has been 
taken, again with no mention of exhaustion, although Articles 6.1 and 6.2 provide export-
ing Members full rights of participation in national administrative proceedings. See AD 
Agreement, supra note 15, art. 17.4 (providing that if final action has been taken by the 
administering authorities, the matter may be referred to the DSB); id. art. 6.1 ("All inter-
ested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given notice of the information 
which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence 
which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in question."); id. art. 6.2 
("Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full oppor-
tunity for the defence of their interests."). The AD Agreement defines "interested parties" 
as including the government of the exporting Member. Id. art. 6.11. Additionally, Article 
13 of the AD Agreement provides that" [elach Member whose national legislation contains 
provisions on anti-dumping measures shall maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative 
tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review of administrative 
actions relating to final determinations and reviews of determinations ... ." Id. art. 13. 
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AD and SCM Agreements suggest that exhaustion of the local rem-
edy mandated under those Agreements is required before a 
request for the establishment of a WTO panel may be made to the 
DSB. For example, the AD and SCM Agreements each mandate 
the establishment of an independent body to review administrative 
determinations made by national investigating authorities. 
Despite the silence of the WTO texts on the applicability of the 
exhaustion doctrine, the WTO Secretariat has offered the follow-
ing black letter law summary of the exhaustion doctrine: "[U] nder 
the DSU there is no requirement to exhaust local remedies before 
instituting dispute setdement proceedings."55 While that may be 
true as a stricdy textual matter, it is questionable whether it is an 
accurate statement of GATT /WTO jurisprudence. 
B. CArr /WFO jurisprudence 
The available GATT jurisprudence provides some insight into 
the status of the exhaustion doctrine at the WTO.56 Turning first 
to adopted GATT panel reports, in two companion cases, United 
States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chil-
led Atlantic Salmon from Norway,57 and United States - Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon 
55. . Note by the Secretariat, Consultation and the Settlement of Disputes Between Members, 'll 
21, WT/WGTI/W/134 (Aug. 7, 2002). 
56. Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply de jure in the WTO, the 
Appellate Body has ruled that adopted GATT panel reports are to be taken into account. 
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 14, WT /DS8/ AB/R 
(Oct. 4,1996): 
Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often 
considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among 
WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are rele-
vant to any dispute. However, they are not binding, except with respect to resolv-
ing the particular dispute between the parties to that dispute. 
See also Bhala, supra note 1, at 936-41 (discussing the status of de jure stare decisis in the 
WTO). Additionally, unadopted GATT panel reports, while having no legal status, are also 
to be considered to the extent that they might provide some useful guidance. See, e.g., 
Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra, at 14-15 ("[W]e agree 
with the Panel's conclusion ... that unadopted panel reports 'have no legal status in the 
GATT or WTO system since they have not been endorsed through decisions by the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES to GATT or WTO Members.' Likewise, we agree that 'a panel could 
nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report that it 
considered to be relevant.'"). 
57. Report of the Panel, United States - Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of 
Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Nrmvay, ADP /87 (Apr. 27, 1994), GATT B.I.S.D. (41st 
Supp.) at 229 (1994) [hereinafter Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and 
Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway]. 
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from Norway (collectively the Norway Salmon Cases), 58 the applicabil-
ity of the doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies in the context of 
AD and CVD disputes was thoroughly argued by the parties but not 
decisively settled by the panel. A later unadopted GATT panel 
report in United States - Anti-Dumping Duties on Gray Pmtland 
Cement (Cement Case) echoed the analysis of the Norway Salmon 
Cases. 59 
1. The Norway Salmon Cases 
In these two cases the United States argued that the doctrine of 
exhaustion of local remedies and the rule of exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies both apply to dispute settlement proceedings 
under the Tokyo Round Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements 
(Tokyo Round Agreements) .60 Norway countered first that the 
doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies applies only to cases of 
diplomatic protection, as distinguished from cases involving "direct 
injury" to a state.61 Norway argued that, in dispute settlement pro-
ceedings under the Tokyo Round Agreements, a signatory was not 
bringing a claim on behalf of one of its nationals,62 but instead 
brought a claim based on the "direct injury" to a signatory in the 
form of nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to that 
signatory.63 
58. Report of the Panel, United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of 
Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from N01Way, SCMj153 (Apr. 28,1994), GATT B.I.S.D. (41st 
Supp.) at 576 (1994) [hereinafter Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and 
Chilled Atlantic Salmon from N01Way]. 
59. See infra Part. III.B.2. 
60. See Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon 
from N01Way, supra note 57, ~ 33 (indicating the argument made by the United States that 
the notion of exhaustion of administrative remedies was closely akin to the notion of 
exhaustion of local remedies); Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chil-
led Atlantic Salmon from N01Way, supra note 58, ~ 22 (noting the argument made by the 
United States that the policies behind the doctrine of administrative remedies were almost 
identical to the rationales underlying the rule of the exhaustion of local remedies). The 
Tokyo Round Antidumping and Subsidies agreements served as the predecessor agree-
ments to the WTO AD and SCM Agreements. 
61. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on lmports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
N01Way, supra note 57, ~ 37; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from N01Way, supra note 58, ~ 25. 
62. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
N01Way, supra note 57, 'lI 37; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from N01Way, supra note 58, 'lI 25. 
63. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
N01Way, supra note 57, ~ 37; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from N01Way, supra note 58, ~ 25. 
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Norway next argued that there was no basis in the texts of the 
Agreements for the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of 
local remedies.64 If the signatories had intended to include such a 
requirement, Norway claimed, they would have done so explic-
itly.65 Moreover, Norway asserted that there was no GATT practice 
recognizing the local remedies doctrine.66 The Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties directs that subsequent practice be 
taken into account when interpreting the provisions of an interna-
tional agreement, and subsequent GATT practice does not require 
the exhaustion of local remedies.67 Furthermore, Norway main-
tained that the exhaustion doctrine was excused where local reme-
dies were inadequate and ineffective, and "[n]o adequate remedy 
was available for Norway in the courts of the United States for a 
breach by the United States of its GATT obligations" because U.S. 
domestic law specifically commands that no provision of any trade 
agreement in conflict with any U.S. statute be given effect under 
U.S. law. 68 
Finally, moving to a policy argument, Norway contended that 
"strong policy considerations dictated that a local remedies doc-
trine not be applied to dispute settlement proceedings" under the 
two Tokyo Round Agreements because it would result in delays in 
the dispute settlement process and would, therefore, be inconsis-
tent with the Tokyo Round Agreements' purpose of timely resolu-
tion of disputes.69 Finally, regarding exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, Norway submitted that "[s]ince the United States 
Department of Commerce and other relevant agencies did not 
apply GATT law on any consistent basis, it was also often futile for a 
64. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imparts of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Nonvay, supra note 57, 1 37; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Nonvay, supra note 58, 1 25. 
65. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imparts of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Nonvay, supra note 57, 1 37; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imparts of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Nonvay, supra note 58, 1 25. 
66. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imparts of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Nonvay, supra note 57, 1 37; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Nonvay, supra note 58, 1 25. 
67. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imparts of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Nonvay, supra note 57, 1 37; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imparts of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Nonvay, supra note 58, 'll 25. 
68. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imparts of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Nonvay, supra note 57, 1 38; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Nonvay, supra note 58, 1 26. 
69. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imparts of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Nonvay, supra note 57, 1 39; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imparts of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Nonvay, supra note 58, 1 27. 
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contracting party to raise GATT related Issues before these 
agencies."70 
The United States countered by arguing that Norway's discus-
sion of the rule of exhaustion of local remedies was immaterial 
because the United States had not argued that the rule applied to 
dispute setdement under the Tokyo Round Agreements, and that, 
regardless, Norway's interpretation of the exhaustion rule was erro-
neous.7! Moreover, relying on the le]'s decision in the ELSI Case, 
the United States argued that the doctrine of exhaustion of local 
remedies applied when a nation was primarily representing its 
nationals, even if some issues of sovereignty were secondarily pre-
sent,72 and that Norway was actually espousing the interests of its 
nationals in these proceedings.73 The United States concluded 
that "Norway's argument that it was adjudicating its own rights 
under the [Tokyo Round] Agreements, separate and apart from 
the interests of its nationals, would create an exemption to the 
local remedies doctrine which would effectively swallow the entire 
doctrine."74 
The GATT panel declined to answer the question of whether the 
doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies applied because the issue 
was not within its terms of reference.7S The panel concluded: 
The United States had argued that the rationale behind this 
concept of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" was akin to 
the rationale behind the public international law doctrine of 
exhaustion of local remedies. However, when Norway argued 
against application of the legal doctrine of exhaustion of local 
remedies in this dispute, the United States had clarified that it 
had not sought application of this doctrine. Consequently, the 
70. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Norway, supra note 57, , 40; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Norway, supra note 58, , 28. 
71. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Norway, supra note 57, , 46; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Norway, supra note 58, 11 33. 
72. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Norway, supra note 57, '!! 46; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Norway, supra note 58, '\I 33. 
73. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Norway, supra note 57, 1. 47; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Norway, supra note 58, 11 34. 
74. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Norway, supra note 57, 1. 47; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Norway, supra note 58, 11 34. 
75. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
Norway, supra note 57, , 348; Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from Norway, supra note 58, 11 217. 
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issue of application of the doctrine of exhaustion of local reme-
dies to dispute settlement under the [Tokyo Round] Agree-
ment[s] was not before the PaneP6 
Thus, the GATT panel exercised judicial restraint by avoiding 
the question of whether the exhaustion doctrine applies in GATT 
dispute settlement proceedings. 77 Nevertheless, on the closely 
related question of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the 
panel explicitly stated: 
The Panel did not find ... any basis for it to refuse to consider a 
claim by a Party in dispute settlement under the [Tokyo Round] 
Agreement[s] merely because the subject matter of the claim 
had not been raised before the investigating authorities under 
domestic law. The Panel considered that, had the drafters of the 
Agreement[s] intended a limitation on the scope of dispute set-
tlement of the nature advocated by the United States, they 
would have included a clear statement to that effect in the 
Agreement[s] .... 78 
The panel clearly was not persuaded by the ICJ's holding in the 
ELSI Case that such an important doctrine of customary interna-
tional law could not be read out of a treaty by implication.79 
2. The Cement Case 
Another GATT dispute where the exhaustion doctrine was 
addressed is the 1992 unadopted GATT panel report in the Cement 
Case. 80 Here, in a pre-NAFTA dispute between Mexico and the 
United States, the United States renewed its exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies argument. According to Mexico, the intent of the 
drafters of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Agreement was not, as 
the United States suggested, to institute the principle of exhaus-
tion against those parties that declined to participate in the admin-
76. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
N01Way, supra note 57, , 348; Imposition of Counteroailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from N01Way, supra note 58, , 217. 
77. See Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon 
from N01Way, supra note 57, , 348 (refraining from deciding whether the exhaustion rule 
applied); Imposition of Counteroailing Duties on ImporlS of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
N01Way, supra note 58, , 217 (refraining from deciding whether the exhaustion rule 
applied). 
78. Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from 
N01Way, supra note 57, 'lI 349; Imposition of Counteroailing Duties on ImporlS of Fresh and Chilled 
Atlantic Salmon from N01Way, supra note 58, , 218. 
79. For a more detailed discussion of the holding in the D.-SI Case, see infra Part II. 
80. Report of the Panel, United States - Anti-Dumping Duties on Gray Portland Cement 
and Cement Clinker from Mexico (Sept. 7, 1992) (unadopted) [hereinafter Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico). 
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istrative proceedings.81 Rather, Mexico argued that the principle 
of exhaustion proposed by the United States would lead to illogical 
and impracticable results-that unless the governments that had 
signed the Agreement became parties to every U.S. antidumping 
investigation involving their producers and made every conceivable 
argument to the U.S. investigating authorities, they would lose 
their international right to make arguments to a GATT dispute set-
tlement panel convened under the Agreement.82 
The United States countered that although the exhaustion prin-
ciple did not mandate that a government of an exporting country 
participate in every antidumping investigation involving its export-
ers or raise every conceivable argument, it did nevertheless require 
that some interested party, whether government or private, raise 
any issue that might later appear in a GATT dispute before 
national investigating authorities first. 83 
As in the Norwegian Salmon case, the panel found that there was 
nothing in the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Agreement that explic-
itly required exhaustion of administrative remedies-an issue did 
not have to have been raised in domestic administrative proceed-
ings for an order resolving an issue to be properly before a GATT 
pane1.84 Parroting the panel in Norwegian Salmon, the Cement panel 
concluded that if the drafters had intended such a fundamental 
restriction on the right of recourse to the Agreement's dispute set-
tlement process, they would have made an explicit provision for 
it.85 The Cement panel, however, limited its review to the facts con-
tained in the administrative record and therefore prevented Mex-
ico from submitting new evidence to the GATT panel that had not 
been before the administrative agency.86 
In sum, GATT jurisprudence has not addressed the precise ques-
tion of whether the doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies is part 
of the GATT acquis, although the Norwegian Salmon and Cement 
cases did reject any requirement that a complaining party first 
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a GATT 
complaint. 
81. Id. , 3.1.6. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. , 3.1.9. 
84. Id.1I 5.9. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. , 5.12. 
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3. The Foreign Sales Corporation Case 
Turning to WTO jurisprudence, the issue of exhaustion of local 
remedies has only been raised and squarely addressed in one WTO 
panel report. In the United States - Foreign Sales Corporation case 
(.Foreign Sales Corporation Case) ,87 the United States argued that text 
in the SCM Agreement expressly directs WTO Members to resolve 
certain issues raised by exemptions from direct taxes in an appro-
priate tax forum before resorting to WTO dispute settlement.88 
The panel disagreed, however, stating that the text cited by the 
United States did not provide "a clear and unambiguous basis for 
circumscribing the right to resort to WTO dispute settlement at 
any time."89 The panel explained: 
[U] nder Article XXIII of CAIT 1994, the DSU and Article 4 of 
the SCM Agreement, a Member has the right to resort to WTO 
dispute settlement at any time by making a request for consulta-
tions in a manner consistent with those provisions. This funda-
mental right to resort to dispute settlement is a core element of 
the WTO system. Accordingly, we believe that a panel should 
not lightly infer a restriction on this right into the WTO Agree-
ment; rather, there should be a clear and unambiguous basis in 
the relevant legal instruments for concluding that such a restric-
tion exists yo 
The Appellate Body did not consider this question on appea1.91 
4. The Section 211 Case 
In another WTO dispute settlement proceeding, United States -
Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 (Section 211 
Case),92 the European Communities brought a complaint against 
the United States alleging, inter alia, that the United States had 
failed to provide effective domestic remedies to protect the intel-
lectual property rights of certain intellectual property owners as 
required under Article 42 of the TRIPS AgreementY3 In its report, 
87. Panel Report, United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, Wfj 
DSI08/R (Oct. 8, 2000). 
88. [d. f 7.12; see also SCM Agreement, supra note 16, Annex I(e) n.59 ("Members 
shall normally attempt to resolve their differences using the facilities of existing bilateral 
tax treaties or other specific international mechanisms ... ."). 
89. United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, supra note 87, 'II 7.19. 
90. [d. 'II 7.17. 
91. See Appellate Body Report, United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corpora-
tions, Wf /DS108/ AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000). 
92. Panel Report, United States - Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, 
WfjDS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001). 
93. [d. 'II 8.92 (noting the argument made by the European Communities that por-
tions of Section 211 violate Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement because Section 211 denies 
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the WTO panel dropped the following footnote: "[T]he rule of 
exhaustion of local remedies is not applicable in this case, as the 
interpretation and application of a treaty between states is what is 
primarily at issue rather than the infringement of rights of individ-
uals."94 Here, the panel was clinging tightly to the notion that 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings do not represent espousal 
claims, but instead represent interpretive disputes of treaty obliga-
tions between states,95 a conclusion completely at odds with the 
one reached by the IC] in the ELSI Case.96 
While none of these GATT and WTO panel reports have 
addressed the specific issue of exhaustion of local remedies in the 
context of AD and CVD proceedings, they do point to the conclu-
sion that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply under the DSU. 
The Appellate Body has not yet ruled on this issue. 
Notwithstanding this body of GATT /WTO jurisprudence, at 
least in the context of disputes brought under the AD and SCM 
Agreements, a complaining WTO Member's characterization of its 
case as an "interpretive dispute" or as a "state-to-state" dispute over 
the meaning of treaty provisions strikes me as a highly formalistic 
depiction and mischaracterization of the true nature of the case, 
which is substantively one of espousal. But for an aggrieved export-
ing producer's complaint that the country of importation has vio-
lated the AD Agreement, the SCM Agreement, or both, there 
unquestionably would be no WTO complaint brought by that pro-
ducer's home country. The purpose of these two Agreements is 
"the availability of US courts to enforce the rights targeted by Section 211 (a) (2)"). Article 
42 of the TRIPS Agreement provides, in part, that "[m]embers shall make available to the 
right holders civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of any intellectual 
property right covered by this Agreement." Id. 'II 8.94 (quoting Article 42 of the TRIPS 
Agreement) (footnote omitted). 
94. Id. 'II 8.95 n.131. 
95. See Scheffer, supra note 24, at 92 ("A 'legislative' treaty, such as the Genocide 
Convention or the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, typically would not require exhaus-
tion of local remedies because the dispute normally would arise directly between two gov-
ernments." (footnotes omitted». 
96. See supra Part II. The WTO panel also noted that "in cases involving [the local 
remedies] rule it has been universally recognized that the remedies available under 
national law must be 'effective' in nature, i.e., they must open the possibility of a genuine 
remedy for the (private) complainant." United States - Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropria-
tions Act of 1998, supra note 92, 'II 8.95 n.131. This exception to the exhaustion doctrine is 
certainly well recognized. The exhaustion doctrine was also raised in another WTO panel 
proceeding, but not addressed by the panel. See Panel Report, Argentina - Measures Affect-
ing the Import of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, 'II 11.249, WT jDS155jR (Dec. 
19, 2000) (noting the argument made by the European Communities that there is no 
obligation to exhaust local remedies before bringing a WTO complaint). 
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broadly twofold: to allow importing countries to protect domestic 
producers from unfair import competition, while simultaneously 
shielding foreign producers from overreaching by national investi-
gating authorities charged with administering domestic unfair 
trade remedy laws. In other words, WTO complaints brought 
under the AD and SCM Agreements do not materialize full-blown 
from a factual vacuum; they are the direct byproduct of insistent 
exporting producers who have successfully lobbied for bringing a 
WTO complaint.97 
As noted above, the IC] chamber in the ELSI Case ruled that the 
parties to a treaty either can "agree that the [exhaustion doctrine] 
shall not apply to claims based on alleged [treaty violations]; or 
confirm that [the doctrine] shall apply."98 But the IC] was unable 
to accept that such an "important principle of customary interna-
tional law" could be rejected in the absence of treaty language 
making such an intention clear.99 Thus, the failure to mention 
exhaustion of local remedies in the treaty's compromissory clause 
did not dispense with the exhaustion requirement before filing an 
application with the IC]. The IC]'s conclusion is thus sharply at 
odds with the one reached by the WTO panels in the Foreign Sales 
Corporation and Section 211 cases. 
C. Exhaustion Under NAFF A Chapter 19 
Alternatively, does NAFfA require NAFfA Parties to delay the 
initiation of WTO dispute settlement proceedings until NAFfA 
Chapter 19 binational dispute settlement proceedings have been 
completed? NAFfA Chapter 19 is silent on this question. NAFfA 
Articles 2005.1 and 2005.3 provide that disputes may be settled by 
97. To suggest that the object of the ,,\ITO Agreements is to protect trade in goods, 
trade in services, and intellectual property simple, rather than to protect producers of 
goods, providers of services, and owners of intellectual property, also strikes me as highly 
. formalistic. See generally Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, World Trade Disputes Settlement and the 
tXhaustion of Local Remedies Rule, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 107, 119-23 (1996) (discussing the 
applicability of the new multilateral trade arrangements resulting from the Uruguay 
Round that contain provisions creating obligations with regard to the treatment of private 
parties). Numerous GATT and WTO dispute settlement reports have "recalled the impor-
tance of security and predictability in the application of tariffs bindings .... [P] revious 
panels and working parties had emphasized that tariff bindings justify reasonable expecta-
tions about market access and conditions of competi tion." Panel Report, Argentina - Mea-
sures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, , 3.63, WT /DS56/R (Nov. 
25, 1997), affd by Appellate Body Report, Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, 
Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WT /DS56/ AB/R (Mar. 27, 1998). These views focus on 
producers and exporters. 
98. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.el 15,42 Guly 20). 
99. Id. 
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either NAFTA or the WTO at the option of the complaining party 
except in cases of environmental, health, and safety disputes where 
the responding country has an exclusive choice of forum. 100 Thus, 
the relevant dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA do not explic-
itly require exhaustion of either the Chapter 19 process or other 
local remedies before resorting to WTO dispute settlement, nor do 
they create an exclusive international remedy under NAFTA Chap-
ter 19. 
D. Parallel Proceedings Under NAFFA Chapter 20? 
Another interesting issue is whether it would be possible for the 
phenomenon of parallel WTO and NAFTA Chapter 19 proceed-
ings to bleed through to NAFTA Chapter 20 (the country-to-coun-
try dispute settlement mechanism 101). This question was briefly 
addressed, but not answered, in 2005 by a WTO panel in Mexico -
Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages. 102 In that case, Mex-
ico argued that the panel should decline to exercise jurisdiction in 
favor of dispute settlement under NAFTA Chapter 20 and sought a 
preliminary ruling to that effect.103 Mexico's reason for urging 
abstention was that there is a different interpretation between Mex-
ico and the United States regarding the conditions provided under 
NAFTA for access of Mexican sugar to the U.S. market. l04 The 
United States acknowledged that this difference has resulted in a 
100. NAFfA, supra note 17, arts. 2005.1, 2005.3. 
101. There have only been three NAFfA Chapter 20 dispute settlement cases to date. 
At the request of the United States, a panel was formed to examine the NAFfA compatibil-
ity of Canada's tariff-rate quotas on imports of U.S. dairy, poultry, eggs, barley, and marga-
rine products. See In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin 
Agricultural Products, CDA-95-2008-01, Final Report of the NAFfA Chapter 20 Panel, 'll'll 
9, 16 (Dec. 2, 1996). The panel found that NAFfA entitled Canada to impose higher 
duties on these U.S. agricultural imports. [d. 'll 209. The second Chapter 20 panel was 
established in January 1997 at the request of Mexico following the lTC's serious injury 
determination in the Section 201 broomcorn brooms case. See In the Matter of the U.S. 
Safeguard Action Taken on Broom Com Brooms from Mexico, USA-97-2008-01, Final 
Report of the NAFfA Chapter 20 Panel, 'll'll 9-10, 17-18 (Jan. 30, 1998) (noting the injury 
determinations made by the ITC). The panel ruled against the United States, finding that 
the ITC had failed to properly explain its decision. [d. 'll 78. In the third Chapter 20 
proceeding, which involved cross-border trucking services and invesunent from Mexico, 
the panel ruled against the United States in its refusal to "review and consider for approval 
any Mexican-owned carrier applications for authority to provide cross-border trucking ser-
vices .... n In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, USA-MEX-98-2008-01, Final 
Report of the NAFfA Chapter 20 Panel, 'll 295 (Feb. 6, 2001). 
102. Panel Report, Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, 'll'll 7.6-.9, 
WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005) (discussing certain provisions of the DSU). 
103. [d. 'll 7.11. 
104. [d. 'll 7.12. 
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dispute under NAFTA that is presently in the panelist selection 
stage. 105 
Nonetheless, neither the subject matter nor the respective posi-
tions of the parties are identical in the respective disputes under 
NAFTA and the DSU.106 In the WIO case, for example, "the com-
plaining party is the United States, and the measures in dispute are 
allegedly imposed by Mexico."107 In the NAFTA case, however, the 
situation is the reverse: "the complaining party is Mexico, and the 
measures in dispute are allegedly imposed by the United States."I08 
Likewise, in the WIO case, the United States alleged "discrimina-
tory treatment against its products resulting from internal taxes 
and other internal measures imposed by Mexico," while in the 
NAFTA case, Mexico argued that "the United States is violating its 
market access commitments under NAFTA."109 
In response to questions from the WIO panel regarding 
whether it could abstain from exercising subject matter jurisdiction 
in deference to NAFTA Chapter 20, the United States responded 
in the negative. 11 0 The WIO panelalso asked whether anything in 
NAFTA would prevent the United States from bringing the present 
case to the WIO dispute settlement system. 1Il The United States 
again responded that "there is nothing in the NAFTA that provides 
that the United States may not bring the present dispute to the 
WIO dispute settlement system."112 
105. [d. 




110. Answers of the United States to Questions of the Panel in Relation to the First 
Substantive Meeting with the Parties, Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Bever-
ages, at 2, WT/DS308 (Dec. 20, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_ 
Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispute_Settlement_ 
Listings/asset_upload_fiIe169_6449.pdf. The United States responded as follows: 
For the Panel to decline to exercise jurisdiction over this dispute would mean that 
the Panel would make no findings on the U.S. claims that Mexico's tax measures 
are inconsistent with Article III of the GATT 1994. This in turn would leave the 
DSB unable to make any recommendations or rulings in accordance with the 
rights and obligations under the DSU and the GATT 1994. Such a result is 
incompatible with the text of the DSU. As noted above, it would require a panel 
to disregard the reason for it~ existence and the mandate given it by the DSB .... 
An approach that would permit a panel to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a 
dispute would be contrary to the ordinary meaning of those provisions and fail to 
preserve the rights and obligations at issue in the dispute. 
[d. at 3. 
111. [d. at 5. 
112. [d. at 6. 
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OnJanuary 18, 2004, the WTO panel issued a preliminary ruling 
rejecting Mexico's request that it decline to exercise jurisdiction in 
favor of an arbitral panel under NAFTA Chapter 20. 113 In arriving 
at this decision, "[t]he Panel concluded that, under the DSU, it 
had no discretion to decide whether or not to exercise its jurisdic-
tion in a case properly before it."1l4 More specifically, the panel 
would be failing to perform its duty under DSU Article 11 to: 
make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including 
an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applica-
bility of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, 
and to make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making 
the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in 
the covered agreements. 115 
Moreover, in the panel's view, "[i]f a WTO panel were to decide 
not to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular case, it would dimin-
ish the rights of the complaining Member under the DSU and 
other WTO covered agreements."116 For these reasons, the WTO 
panel rejected Mexico's request to decline jurisdiction in favor of 
an arbitral panel under NAFTA Chapter 20.117 
The WTO panel did not address the question whether absten-
tion would have been proper had either Mexico or the United 
States initiated a NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute settlement proceed-
ing and then brought a parallel proceeding under the DSU. The 
crux of Mexico's argument that the United States' WTO claims be 
pursued first under NAFTA was that it would allow Mexico to 
simultaneously pursue a different, yet related, claim against the 
United States under NAFTA.1l8 The WTO panel expressed fear 
that if Mexico's argument was entertained, then there would be 
"no practical limit to the factors that could legitimately be taken 
into account" when deciding to exercise jurisdiction, 1 19 and the 
decision to exercise jurisdiction would thus become political rather 
than legal in nature.I20 On the basis of the WTO panel's reading 
of the DSU, there is every indication that if the complaining parties 
113. Panel Report, Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, i 7.18, 
WfjDS308jR (Oct. 7, 2005) (indicating the decision by the Panel to reject Mexico's 
request that the Panel decline to exercise jurisdiction in favor of an Arbitral Panel under 
Chapter 20 of NAFTA). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. i 7.8. 
116. Id.' 7.9. 
117. Id. 'll 7.18. 
118. Id. i 7.17. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
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and the issues had been the same in a NAFfA Chapter 20 dispute 
as they were in a parallel WTO dispute settlement proceeding, the 
WTO panel would not have declined to exercise jurisdiction. 
IV. AMEND THE AD AND SCM AGREEMENTS AND NAFfA 
CHAPTER 19 
The IC]'s decision in the ELSI Case that the doctrine of exhaus-
tion of local remedies applies in state-to-state dispute settlement 
involving an alleged treaty violation is irreconcilable with the 
GATT and WTO panels' views on exhaustion. The IC] has ruled 
that exhaustion is only excused if the treaty expressly provides for 
it, while the GATT /WTO panels have ruled that exhaustion must 
be expressly required. l2l Even though the AD and SCM Agree-
ments both require that national investigating authorities' determi-
nations be subject to independent review-giving rise to a strong 
inference that this appellate review mechanism must be exhausted 
before a WTO challenge may be made-the view at the WTO 
seems to be that exhaustion is not required. 
All of the rationales for the exhaustion doctrine would be 
advanced by requiring exhaustion in the AD and CVD context. 
First, international trade friction would be reduced because cases 
would be eliminated from the Appellate Body's docket. Second, 
international tribunals would be relieved from being excessively 
burdened with litigation. Regarding the caseload pressures faced 
by the Appellate Body, James Bacchus, former chairman of the 
Appellate Body, made the following observations in 2004: 
Although it was originally envisaged that the workload of Appel-
late Body Members would be light, it is now generally recog-
nized that the workload is very demanding. The average number 
of days per year spent by Appellate Body Members working on 
appeals is 174, with a high of 231 in 2001. The bulk of that work 
is conducted in Geneva; the average number of days spent per 
year in Geneva is 117, with a high of 170 in 2001. It is antici-
pated that the workload will continue to be significant over the 
next two years at a minimum, due to the fact that more panels 
have been established in 2003 than ever before, and the fact that 
71 percent of panel reports have been appealed since 1995. 
121. See supra notes 46-47, 89-90, and accompanying text. Professor Raj Bhala has 
explained that the myth that there is no WTO stare decisis might be a consequence of ICJ 
case law holding that there is no stare decisis at the Ie]. See Bhala, supra note I, at 891-901. 
If true, it is unfortunate that the same kind of "bleed through" did not occur in the case of 
the exhaustion doctrine. 
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There is no reason to assume that the workload will decline sig-
nificantly in the years to follow. 122 
73 
Thus, conserving the overtaxed resources of the WTO Appellate 
Body is yet another reason for requiring that the NAFfA Chapter 
19 process run its full course before Canada, Mexico, or the United 
States initiate a parallel WTO dispute settlement proceeding. In 
connection with the WTO caseload, as noted above, nearly half of 
all WTO panel proceedings have involved disputes arising under 
either the AD or SCM Agreement. 123 It would therefore seem 
advisable not only to require that the NAFfA Chapter 19 process 
run its full course before WTO dispute settlement proceedings are 
initiated, but also to require that all domestic administrative review 
proceedings within all WTO Member States be exhausted before 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings are brought under the AD 
and SCM Agreements. 
Third, the exhaustion doctrine relieves states from having to 
espouse claims that might be resolved at a lower level. For exam-
ple, a Chapter 19 panel decision might render a potential WTO 
complaint moot, thereby conserving the overtaxed resources of the 
Appellate Body. Such a result would have been reached, for exam-
ple, in Certain Softwood Products from Canada, where both the 
NAFf A Chapter 19 panel and the WTO panel reached the same 
result, concluding that the U.S. International Trade Commission's 
threat of material injury determination was unlawful. I24 Similarly, 
in Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada, a NAFfA Chapter 19 panel 
remanded the U.S. International Trade Commission's affirmative 
injury determination. 125 Following remand, the Commission 
issued a negative injury determination, thereby mooting for all 
practical purposes Canada's request for the establishment of a 
WTO panel in a parallel DSU proceeding.126 
122. Letter from the Chairman of the Appellate Body, WID Committee on Budget, 
Finance and Administration, at 3, WT/BFA/W/109 (Mar. 18,2004) (footnote omitted). 
123. See id. (discussing the workload of the appellate body). 
124. Compare In the Matter of Certain Softwood Products from Canada, USA-CDA-
2002-1904-07, Final Affirmative Threat of Injury Determination, at 7 (Aug. 31, 2004) 
(directing the lTC, in a decision of the Panel pursuant to NAFTA, to enter a negative 
threat of material injury determination on remand), with Panel Report, United States -
Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, ~ 8.1, WI' / 
DS277/R (Mar. 22, 2004) (reversing the lTC's threat of material injury determination). 
125. In the Matter of Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada, USA-CDA-2003-1904-06, 
Decision of the NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel, at 65 (remanding the Commission's injury 
determination for further review). 
126. Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada, USITC Pub 3806, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-430B 
& 731-TA-1019B (Remand), at 1, (Oct. 5, 2005), available at http://www.usitc.gov/excrela-
tions/newsJelease/2005/wheat1.pdf (determining that there is no material injury to an 
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Absent a ruling by tht; Appellate Body that exhaustion is 
required under the AD and SCM Agreements, the DSU or the AD 
and SCM Agreements should be amended to explicitly state that 
the exhaustion doctrine applies. At the same time, NAFTA Chap-
ter 19 should be amended to require exhaustion of the binational 
panel review process as a precondition to bringing any complaint 
to the wrO. 127 
NAFTA Chapter 19 also needs a shot of automaticity in the bina-
tional panelist selection process in order to remove prolonged 
delay as a ground for excusing exhaustion. Furthermore, to the 
extent that NAFTA Chapter 19 proceedings are unreasonably 
delayed or prolonged, one of the exceptions to the exhaustion rule 
should be triggered. Arguably, this was the case when the United 
States brought its wro complaint against Mexico before comple-
tion of the NAFTA Chapter 19 process concerning AD duties on 
imports of high-fructose corn syrup.128 Because it took a number 
of months before the Chapter 19 panel was established, the United 
industry in the United States because of imports of hard red spring wheat from Canada). 
Compare In the Matter of Oil Country Tubular Goods From Mexico, VSA-MEX-2001-1904-
03, Final Decision of the NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel, at 17 (Feb. 11,2005) ("[T]he Depart-
ment of Commerce's Sunset Policy Bulletin is a reasonable and permissible construction of 
the statute and the [Statement of Administrative Action], and is entitled to deference from 
the Panel .... "), with Appellate Body Report, United States - Anti-Dum/Jing Measures on Oil 
Country Tubular Goods (OCTG)from Mexico, ~ 220, WT/DS282/ AB/R (Nov. 2, 2005) (declin-
ing to make any additional recommendation regarding the Panel's finding that the Depart-
ment of Commerce's likelihood of dumping determination in the sunset review was 
inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement). 
127. In the event one of the NAFTA Parties were to initiate WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings before the NAFTA Chapter 19 process had been exhausted, a WTO panel 
would be guided by customary international law rules of treaty interpretation to resolve the 
conflict in favor of NAFTA. See DSU, supra note 2, art. 3.2 (noting that the dispute settle-
ment provisions serve to clarity provisions in the agreements covered by the dispute settle-
ment system "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law"). Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that, in the 
event of a conflict between two treaties, the latter-in-time controls. Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 22,1969,1155 V.N.T.S. 331 ("Any subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its pro-
visions [should be taken into account] .... "). Since any amendment to NAFTA Chapter 
19 would postdate the WTO agreements, the former would control. Even though the 
United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, the customary international law rule 
of lex specialis (the more specialized agreement prevails over the more general) and of lex 
posterior (the agreement signed later in time prevails over the earlier one) would be used to 
resolve the DSU-NAFTA conflict in favor of the NAFTA amendment. Moreover, NAFTA 
Article 103.2 drives home the point that in the event of a conflict between NAFTA and 
WTO Agreements, NAFTA prevails. NAFTA, supra note 17, art. 103.2. 
128. See Final Decision, Review of the Final Determination of the Antidumping Investigation 
on Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup, Originatingfrom the United States of America, MEX-USA-
98-1904-01, at 6 (Aug. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Review of the Final Determination of the Antidump-
ing Investigation on Imports of High Fructose Corn SyruP]. ' 
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States purportedly ran out of patience and brought a WTO 
complaint. 129 
Similarly, nearly four years elapsed in the Oil Country Tubular 
Goods case between the request for Chapter 19 panel review and 
the panel's decision. l30 Unlike NAFfA Chapter 20 and the DSU, 
NAFf A Chapter 19 has no default mechanism for appointing dis-
pute settlement panelists if one of the disputing countries fails to 
select its panelists in a timely fashion. 131 NAFfA Chapter 19 
should therefore be amended to provide that, in the event a disput-
ing Party fails to appoint its panelists within thirty days of a request 
for binational panel review, the other disputing Party may select 
such panelists by lot from among the roster members who are citi-
zens of the disputing Party that has failed to appoint its panelists. 132 
Notwithstanding the absence of an express exhaustion rule in 
either the DSU or NAFfA, the unique nature of NAFfA Chapter 
19 dispute settlement favors application of the exhaustion doctrine 
as a matter of policy. Under NAFfA Chapter 19, the NAFfA coun-
129. NAFFA Dispute Settlement Falls Short of Promise for Quick Action, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 
Jan. 23, 2004, at 12, 13 (noting that in the case involving a challenge by the United States 
to a Mexican antidumpting duty on high fructose corn syrup, Mexico refused to name the 
NAFTA panelists for almost two years). As noted by the NAFTA Chapter 19 panel in its 
first decision in the High Fructose Cam Syrup case: 
This case was initiated by the United States' exporters of HFCS in February of 
1998 when they filed their complaint with the Mexican Section of the NAFTA 
Secretariat. A series of delays in appointment of the members of the Panel 
resulted in the case not being heard until August of 2000, while procedural 
motions and challenges to the authority of the Panel have resulted in the delay of 
the final decision until this date. In part because of these delays, a case challeng-
ing these anti-dumping duties was brought against Mexico by the United States 
before the World Trade Organization. In January of 2000, the WTO Dispute Set-
tlement Body found that Mexico had failed to establish the threat of iqiury to the 
sugar industry necessary to justify the duties .... The existence of the parallel 
proceeding before the WTO raised some novel questions for this NAFTA Panel 
and the decision includes a discussion of the relationship between the two pro-
ceedings, and an explanation for why the Panel adopted some of the findings of 
the WTO panel. 
Review of the Final Determination of the Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High Fructose 
Cam Syrup, supra note 128, at 6. 
130. In the Matter of Oil Country Tubular Goods From Mexico, supra note 126, at 1-2 
(indicating that the decision of the Panel was issued on February II, 2005, yet the Panel 
was constituted pursuant to a request filed in 2001). 
131. NAFTA, supra note 17, annex 1901.2 (nothing in Annex 1901.2, which provides 
for the establishment of Chapter 19 Panels, provides for the selection of panelists in the 
event that one country fails to timely select panelists). 
132. Compare NAFTA, supra note 17, art. 2011.1 (d) (setting forth the default provision 
for selection of panelists in the event disputing parties fail to make selection in a Chapter 
20 dispute proceeding), with DSU, supra note 2, art. 8.7 (providing that if there is no agree-
ment on the panelists, the panel shall be formed "by appointing the panelists whom [the 
Director-General] considers most appropriate ... after consulting with the parties to the 
dispute"). 
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tries have created a supranational dispute settlement forum where 
the disputing countries are able to choose impartial adjudicators 
and where the NAFTA countries have full rights of participation. 
Concededly, that treaty-based forum applies domestic law as gov-
erning law, but not necessarily to the exclusion of international 
law, including the WTO AD and SCM Agreements. 133 
V. CONCLUSION 
The phenomenon of parallel WTO and NAFT A Chapter 19 pro-
ceedings, in which the exhaustion doctrine has not played a role, 
illustrates how domestic political pressure can force resort to every 
available international forum in order to win a trade remedy case. 
It simultaneously illuminates the frustration evident with the 
NAFTA Chapter 19 process by the parties that negotiated it, as well 
as the lack of firm commitment to this process. The doctrine of 
exhaustion has an important role to play in strengthening both the 
WTO and NAFTA Chapter 19 dispute settlement processes. 
Accordingly, the AD and SCM Agreements should be amended to 
make clear that exhaustion of local remedies is required before an 
unfair trade remedy complaint may be brought under the DSU. At 
the same time, NAFTA Chapter 19 should be amended to provide 
for the automatic selection of panelists in the event one of the dis-
133. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n 
act of Congress ought never to be constnted to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible constntction remains .... "). Applying the Charming Betsy canon of statutory con-
stntction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently indicated the following 
with regard to interpreting U.S. unfair trade remedy laws in light of U.S. WTO obligations: 
[T]he WTO issued an appellate report stating that the [Commerce Depart-
ment's] same-person methodology violates § 123 of the URAA. The WTO specifi-
cally rejected the argument that sales of assets should be treated differently from 
sales of stock for assessing countervailing duties. Accordingly, where neither the 
statute nor the legislative history supports the [Commerce Department's] same-
person methodology under domestic countervailing duty law, this court finds 
additional support for constnting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (F) as consistent with the 
determination of the WTO appellate panel. In so doing, this court recognizes 
that the Charming Betsy doctrine is only a guide; the WTO's appellate report does 
not bind this court in constnting domestic countervailing duty law. Nonetheless, 
this guideline supports the trial court's judgment. 
Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations 
omitted); see also Luigi Bormioli Corp. v. United States, 304 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (noting that unfair trade remedy laws "must be interpreted to be consistent with 
[international] obligations, absent contrary indications in the statutory language or its leg-
islative history"); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572,1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(noting that trade remedy laws are not exempt from the Charming Betsy principle). But see 
COntS Staal BV v. Dep't of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that 
WTO decisions are not binding on the United States and that if U.S. statutory provisions 
are inconsistent with the GATT or a WTO agreement, U.S. courts must enforce U.S. statu-
tory provisions). 
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puting NAFTA Parties fails to appoint its panelists in a timely 
manner. 
Moreover, in certain cases the exhaustion doctrine effectively 
subsumes many of the other rules of judicial restraint. For exam-
ple, unless local remedies have been exhausted, a case arguably is 
not ripe because, if local remedies are pursued to a successful con-
clusion, such local remedies may moot a WTO dispute settlement 
proceeding for all practical purposes. Furthermore, unless local 
remedies have been exhausted, a WTO Member could be deemed 
to lack standing to complain about an alleged violation of one of 
the WTO agreements. Thus, by requiring exhaustion, some of the 
criticisms regarding the absence of rules on judicial restraint in the 
DSU would simultaneously be resolved. 
Unfortunately, summoning political will to address larger trade 
issues, such as WTO reform of farm subsidies, requires a Herculean 
effort, often with Sisyphean results. With such major issues taking 
precedence, the odds are not very good that either the relevant 
WTO agreements or NAFTA Chapter 19 will be amended to incor-
porate the doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies given their rel-
atively lower priority among the more pressing trade issues of the 
day. 
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APPENDIX I 
Proposals for DSU Reform: 
• require that mutually agreed solutions be reported in detail so 
that all WTO Members are able to understand them;134 
• resolve the so-called sequencing issue under DSU Articles 21.2 
and 22 of whether suspension of concessions may precede a Dis-
pute Settlement Body (DSB) determination of the WTO consis-
tency of an implementation measure, or whether the matter must 
first go before a compliance panel and then, assuming a finding of 
WTO inconsistency, concessions may be suspended;135 
• amend DSU time limits so that the overall period from the start 
of a proceeding to the suspension of concessions is not increased 
as a result of the proposed sequencing amendment to Articles 21.2 
and 22;136 
• expand third-party rights;137 
• improve the rights of developing countries in the dispute settle-
ment process;138 
• discontinue the ad hoc selection of dispute settlement panelists 
in favor of creating a permanent panel body akin to the permanent 
134. See Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, Special Session 
of the Dispute Settlement Body, at 3, TN/DS/9 (June 6, 2003). 
135. See Communication from Canada, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Ecuador, the Euro-
pean Communities and its member States, Hungary, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, 
Peru, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand and Venezuela, Proposed Amendment of the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding, n 1-8, WT/MIN(99)/8 (Nov. 22,1999), amended byWT/MIN(99)/ 
8/Corr. 1 (Nov. 23, 1999). 
136. See id. n 11, 15. 
137. See id. " 17-19. A proposed amendment to paragraph three of Article 10 recom-
mended that: 
Each third party ... receive a copy of all documents or information submitted to 
the panel, at the time of submission .... [AJ third party may observe any of the 
substantive meetings of the panel with the parties, except for portions of sessions 
when such factual confidential information is discussed. 
[d. , 17. 
138. See id. , 9. Among the proposals is automatic selection of a panelist from a devel-
oping country, where a developing country is a party to a dispute settlement proceeding, 
and mandatory consideration of the particular problems of developing countries when 
DSU proceedings are initiated. See Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, supra note 134, at 5. It has also been proposed, for example, that a trust fund 
be established to finance the hiring of defense counsel to assist developing countries that 
are involved in dispute settlement proceedings. See Ragosta, supra note I, at 737 (noting 
that a number of proposals have been made to improve the participation of developing 
countries in the WTO dispute settlement process). 
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Appellate Body, which would eliminate the selection of panelists as 
one source of delay in the dispute setdement process;139 
• make trade compensation, second in the hierarchy of WTO 
remedies after removal of the offending measure, a more attractive 
alternative to suspension of concessions (third in the hierarchy of 
remedies) ; 140 
• amend the DSU to specifically provide that a WTO Member 
does not have the ability to unilaterally modifY the list of conces-
sions or other obligations for which a DSB authorization has been 
granted (the so-called carousel retaliation issue);141 
• create an expedited compliance panel procedure in case a 
WTO Member implements the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB after another Member has been authorized to suspend 
concessions or other obligations; 142 
• make panel and Appellate Body proceedings more transparent 
by opening them to the public143 and by making written submis-
sions publicly available on a case-by-case basis; 144 
• give private parties the right to present their views at dispute 
setdement proceedings or at least to observe such proceedings;145 
139. See Contribution From the European Communities, Contribution of the European 
Communities and Its Member States to the Improvement of the wro Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing, at 2-3, TN/DS/W II (March 13, 2002) [hereinafter Contribution of the European 
Communities] . 
140. See id. at 4-5 (noting that trade compensation is currently not a realistic option 
before the application of trade sanctions). 
141. See id. at 6. 
142. See id. 
l43. See id. at 6-7 ("The DSU should therefore provide sufficient flexibility for parties 
to decide whether certain parts of the proceeding before the panel or the Appellate Body 
should be open to the public for attendance."). 
l44. See Ragosta, supra note 1, at 735 (noting that numerous proposals in the area of 
the need for transparency have been made, including requiring parties to make their sub-
missions public). Ragosta also notes that in ajudicial environment, "secrecy must give way 
to transparency in order to maintain faith in the system." Id. 
145. See id. at 734 ("Private parties should not be subject to binding Judicial' decisions 
without the opportunity to have their day in court."); see also Joel P. Trachtman & Philip M. 
Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in wro Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It 
Anyway?, 44 HARv. INT'L LJ. 221, 221 (2003) ("There are a number of different ways in 
which private persons might participate in WTO dispute settlement procedures, such as 
through rights to observe ... ."). On August 2, 2005, the WTO panel, in United States -
Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, announced that its proceed-
ings would be open to the public via closed circuit television. See Communication from the 
Chairman of the Panels, United States - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hor-
mones Dispute, Canada - Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, WT I 
DS320/8, WT/DS321/8 (Aug. 2, 2005). On September 12, 2005,joumalists, NCO repre-
sentatives, scholars, and others observed the proceedings, in the first WTO legal proceed-
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• create a regularized procedure for the submission of amicus 
briefs· 146 , 
• increase the number of Appellate Body members from its cur-
rent seven and make the appointment to the Appellate Body full-
time'}47 , 
• require that the Appellate Body issue an interim report as is 
currently done by panels;148 authorize the Appellate Body to 
remand proceedings so that panels can more fully develop and 
clarify disputed fact issues;149 
• permit the Appellate Body to award costs to the prevailing 
party; 150 
• reduce the time for DSB adoption of panel and Appellate Body 
reports;151 
• allow for adoption by consensus of selected portions of panel 
and Appellate Body reports, as opposed to the current rule of 
wholesale adoption or rejection; 152 
ing made open to the public. See Dispute Settlement, Focus WTO NEwsL. (V{fO, Geneva, 
Switz.), Sept. 2005, at 2, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/focus_e/focus63_e 
.pdf. 
146. See Contribution of the European Communities, supra note 139, at 7 ("[I]t is nec-
essary to define better the framework and the conditions for allowing such amicus curiae 
briefs in potentially all cases."); see also Ragosta, supra note 1, at 736-37 (noting that the 
procedural rules regarding the submission of amicus briefs are in dispute). India and 
other developing countries have countered, however, that amicus submissions should be 
prohibited. See Communication from India on behalf of Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia, Dispute Settlement Understanding Proposals: Legal 
Text, at 2, TN/DS/W/47 (Feb. 11, 2003) ("The Appellate Body shall neither seek nor 
accept information from anyone other than the parties and third parties to a dispute."). 
147. See Contribution of the European Communities, supra note 139, at 8 ("[I]t would 
appear desirable to convert the mandate of the Appellate Body Members into a full-time 
appointment."); Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, supra note 
134, at 7 (noting the possible modification of the total number of Appellate Body 
members). 
148. See Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, supra note 134, 
at 7. 
149. See Contribution of the European Communities, supra note 139, at 8. 
150. See Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee, supra note 134, 
at 17. 
151. See WiIliamJ. Davey, The wro: Lookingfor Answers, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 3,22 (2006) 
(" [T] he time between circulation of reports and the deadline for adoption should be 
halved .... "). 
152. See Textual Contribution by Chile and the United States, Negotiations on Improve-
ments and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding on Improving Flexibility and Mem-
ber Control in wro Dispute Settlement, at 2, TN/DS/W/52 (Mar. 14,2003). 
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• provide for provisional remedies, increase the size of suspen-
sion of concessions over time, and allow for payments of fines or 
penalties in lieu of suspension of concessions. 153 
153. See Communication from Mexico, Amendments to the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Proposed Text by Mexico, at 2-3, TN/DS/W /40 
Uan. 27, 2003); see also Brendan P. McGivern, Seeking Compliance with lVI'O Rulings: Theory, 
Practice and Alternatives, 36 INT'L LAw. 141, 156 (2002) (suggesting that punitive retaliation 
may be counterproductive). 
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APPENDIX II 
PARALLEL UNFAIR TRADE REMEDY PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT UNDER 
NAFfA CHAPTER 19 AND THE DSU 
NAFT A Chapter 19 Panels WTO Dispute Settlement Panels 
CERTAIN SOFfWOOD LUMBER PROD- UNITED STATES - FINAL DUMPING 
UCTS FROM CANADA, USA-CDA-2002- DETERMINATION ON SOFfWOOD 
1904-02 (Department of Commerce Final LUMBER FROM CANADA, WT/DS264/ 
Determination) AB/R 
Request for panel review filed May 2002; Request for the establishment of panel by 
panel decisions issued July 17, 2003; Canada Dec. 9, 2002; Appellate Body 
March 5, 2004; June 9, 2005 Report adopted Aug. 31, 2004 
Core Issues: Core Issues: 
1. Whether Commerce erred in employ- 1. Whether the Commerce acted incon-
ing a practice of "zeroing" when deter- sistently with AD Agreement in determin-
mining weighted average margins of ing the existence of dumping margins on 
dumping. the basis of a methodology incorporating 
2. Whether Commerce properly treated the practice of "zeroing." 
certain expenses of Abitibi, Canadian 2. Whether Commerce acted inconsis-
softwood lumber producer. tently with AD Agreement in its calcula-
3. Whether Commerce properly treated tion of the amount for financial expense 
certain costs of Tembec, a Canadian soft- for softwood lumber for Abitibi, a Cana-
wood lumber producer. dian softwood lumber producer. 
3. Whether Commerce acted inconsis-
tently with AD Agreement in its calcula-
tion of the amount for by-product 
revenue from the sale of wood chips as 
an offset in the calculation of the cost of 
production of Tembec, a Canadian soft-
wood lumber producer. 
IMPORTS OF HIGH-FRUCTOSE CORN MEXICO - ANTI-DUMPING INVESTI-
SYRUP ORIGINATING IN THE UNITED GATION OF HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN 
STATES OF AMERICA, MEX-USA-98- SYRUP (HFCS) FROM THE UNITED 
1904-01 (antidumping determination) STATES, WT/DS132/R 
Request for panel review filed Feb. 1998; Request for establishment of panel filed 
panel decisions issued Aug. 3, 2001; April by the United States Oct. 1998; Panel 
15, 2002 Report adopted Feb. 24, 2000 
Core Issue: Core Issue: 
Whether the Secretariat of the Economy Whether Mexico's investigating authority 
established that imports of HFCS acted consistently with AD Agreement 
threatened the economic health of the when, in conducting its analysis of threat 
Mexican sugar industry. of injury, it examined only those factors 
listed in Article 3.7 that are specific to 
"threat," and did not examine the il~ury 
factors listed in Article 3.4. 
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OIL COUNTRY TUBULAR GOODS FROM United States - Mexican OCTG AD Mea-
MEXICO, USA-MEX-2001-1904-03 (Depart- sures, wr /DS282/R 
ment of Commerce Final Results of Sunset 
Review of Antidumping Duty Order) Request for establishment of panel filed by 
Mexico July 2003; Panel Report circulated 
Request for panel review April 2001; panel June 20, 2005; Appellate Body report issued 
decision issued Feb. 11, 2005 Nov. 2, 2005 
Core Issues: Core Issues: 
1. Whether the Department's Sunset Policy 1. Whether the Sunset Policy Bulletin estab-
Bulletin was consistent with the antidump- lishes an irrebuttable presumption and is 
ing duty statute and legislative history. thus inconsistent with AD Agreement. 
2. Whether the Deparunent's interpretation 2. Whether the determination of likelihood 
and application of the term "likely" in con- of continuation or recurrence of dumping 
ducting five-year sunset reviews is proper. is inconsistent with AD Agreement. 
3. Whether he Department's decision not to 3. Whether 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675a(a)(l) and 
consider factors other than pre- and post- (5), which deal with the likelihood of con-
order margins and volumes in making its tinuation or recurrence of injury in sunset 
determination was proper. reviews, are inconsistent with AD Agree-
4. Whether the automatic initiation by the ment. 
Deparunent of the sunset review procedure 
was proper. 
CERTAIN SOFTWOOD LUMBER PROD- UNITED STATES - FINAL COUNTER-
UCTS FROM CANADA, USA-CDA-2002- VAILING DUlY DETERMINATION WITH 
1904-03 (Department of Commerce Final RESPECT TO CERTAIN SOFTWOOD 
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determina- LUMBER FROM CANADA, wr/DS257/ 
tion) AB/R 
Request for panel review filed May 2002 Request for establishment of panel filed by 
Canada Aug. 2002; Appellate Body Report 
Core Issues: adopted Feb. 2004. 
1. Whether Commerce's determination that Recourse to Article 21.5 requested by 
Canadian provinces are providing a finan- Canada Dec. 2004, wr /DS257 / AB/RW. 
cial contribution in the form of the provi- Appellate Body report issued Dec. 5, 2005. 
sion of a good by providing standing timber 
to timber harvesters through the stumpage Core Issues: 
programs is consistent with the governing 1. Whether Commerce's determination that 
statute. Canadian provinces are providing a financial 
2. Whether Commerce may use a bench- contribution in the form of the provision of 
mark other than private prices when it has a good by providing standing timber to tim-
been established that private prices of the ber harvesters through the stum page pro-
goods in question in that country are dis- grams is consistent with the SCM Agreement. 
toTted because of the predominant role of 2. Whether an investigating authority may 
the government in the market as a provider use a benchmark other than private prices 
of the same or similar goods. in the country of provision, when it has 
3. Whether Commerce must conduct a pass- been established that private prices of the 
through analysis to determine whether the goods in question in that country are dis-
alleged subsidy provided to the tenure tOTted because of the predominant role of 
holder is passed through to the producer of the government in the market as a provider 
the subject merchandise. of the same or similar goods. 
3. Whether Commerce's failure to conduct 
a pass-through analysis in respect of arm's 
length sales of logs by tenured harvesters/ 
sawmills to unrelated sawmills is inconsist-
ent with SCM Agreement. 
4. Whether Commerce's failure to conduct 
a pass-through analysis in respect of arm's 
length sales of lumber by tenured harvest-
ers/sawmills to unrelated remanufacturers is 
inconsistent with SCM Agreement. 
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CERTAIN SOFTWOOD LUMBER PROD- UNITED STATES - INVESTIGATION OF 
UCTS FROM CANADA, USA-CDA-2002- THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMIS-
1904-07 (USITC Final Injury Determina- SION IN SOFTWOOD LUMBER FROM 
tion) CANADA, WI /DS277 / AB/R 
Request for panel review filed May 2002; Request for the establishment of panel filed 
panel decisions issued Sept. 5, 2003; April by Canada April 2003; Panel Report 
19, 2004; Aug. 31, 2004 adopted April 26, 2004 
Core Issues: Core Issues: 
1. Whether the Commission's determination 1. Whether under the totali ty of the factors 
that the domestic softwood lumber industry considered and the reasoning in the lTC's 
is threatened with material injury by reason determination, the finding of a likely immi-
of subsidized and dumped imports is sup- nent substantial increase in imports is one 
ported by substantial evidence. which could have been reached by an objec-
2. Whether the Commission ensured that tive and unbiased investigating authority. 
the threatened injury is "by reason of' sub- 2. Whether the lTC's determination is con-
ject imports, and that it did not attribute to sistent with the obligation that injury caused 
subject imports threatened injury from by non-import factors not be attributed to 
other sources in finding that subject the subject imports. 
imports threaten to cause material injury. 
CERTAIN SOFTWOOD LUMBER PROD- UNITED STATES-Investigation of the 
UCTS FROM CANADA, USA-CDA-2005- International Trade Commission in Soft-
1904-03 (USITC Implementation of the new wood Lumber From Canada, Recourse by 
affirmative injury determination under Sec- Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WI/ 
tion 129(a)(4) of the Uruguay Round DS277/RW 
Agreements Act) 
Request for the establishment of a panel 
Request for panel review filed May 2005. filed by Canada on Feb. 14, 2005. Report of 
the Panel issued Nov. 15, 2005. 
Panel concludes that the ITC acted consist-
ently with the Agreement on Antidumping 
and the Agreement on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures when it issued an 
affirmative injury determination following. 
GRAY PORTLAND CEMENT AND UNITED STATES-CEMENT AD MEA-
CLINKER FROM MEXICO (Panel reviews SURES, WI/DS28I (5th-11th Commerce 
of 5th-II th Commerce Department adminis- Department administrative reviews and ITC 
trative reviews and ITC and Commerce and Commerce Department sunset reviews) 
Department sunset reviews) 
Request for the establishment of panel filed 
Panel reviews completed for 5th and 7th by Mexico Aug. 2003. Panel proceedings 
administrative reviews. Panel proceedings suspended under three-year settlement 
still active in the 6th and the 8th-ll th agreement, effective April 3, 2006. 
administrative reviews and sunset reviews. 
Panel proceedings suspended under three- Core Issue: 
year settlement agreement, effective April 3, 1. Mexico challenges virtually every aspect 
2006. of the Commerce Department's determina-
tion in the fifth through eleventh adminis-
Core Issue: trative reviews and its sunset review. Mexico 
1. Mexican cement producers challenge vir- challenges virtually every aspect of the lTC's 
tually every aspect of the Commerce Depart- sunset review. 
ment's determination in the 5th through 
11 th administrative reviews and its sunset 
review. The Mexican producers challenge 
virtually every aspect of the lTC's sunset 
review. 
HeinOnline -- 39 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 85 2007
2007] Parallel Proceedings 85 
HARD RED SPRING WHEAT FROM 
CANADA, USA-CDA-2003-1904-06 (USITC 
Final Injury Detennination) 
Request for panel review filed Nov. 2003; 
panel decision issued June 7, 2005. Panel 
remand detennination issued Dec. 12, 2005, 
affinning lTC's negative injury detennina-
tion and tenninating proceeding. 
Core Issues: 
1. Whether the Commission erred in find-
ing that the volume of subject imports was 
significant. 
2. Whether the Commission failed to con-
sider factors other than the subject imports 
as the cause of injury to domestic produc-
ers, including (a) the different level of 
trade at which the domestic product and 
the subject imports compete within the 
United States, (b) the impact on wheat 
prices of prices for HRS wheat on the Min-
neapolis Grain Exchange, and (c) the fact 
that prices for hard red winter wheat, which 
the Commission determined to be a sepa-
rate product from HRS wheat, move in tan-
dem with prices for HRS wheat. 
3. Whether the Commission's finding of sig-
nificant price underselling and significant 
price suppression is allegedly unsupported 
by substantial evidence. 
4. Whether Commission's finding that 
prices declined between the 2000/01 and 
2001/02 crop years, and the contribution of 
subject imports to that alleged price 
decline, is unsupported by substantial evi-
dence. 
UNITED STATES - DETERMINATION OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION IN HARD RED SPRING WHEAT 
FROM CANADA, WT/DS310 
Request for the establishment of panel filed 
by Canada June 2004 (panel not established 
as of Sept. 2005). 
Core Issues: 
1. Whether the United States violated the 
AD and SCM Agreements by failing to con-
duct an objective examination of both (a) 
the volume of the dumped and subsidized 
imports and the effect of those imports on 
prices in the domestic market for like prod-
ucts, and (b) the consequent impact of 
those imports on domestic producers of 
such products. 
2. Whether the United States violated the 
AD and SCM Agreements by failing to prop-
erly consider the effect of the dumped and 
subsidized imports on prices, including 
whether there had been a significant price 
undercutting by the dumped and subsidized 
imports and whether the effect of those 
imports was otherwise to depress prices to a 
significant degree. 
3. Whether the United States violated the 
AD and SCM Agreements by failing to prop-
erly examine the impact of the dumped 
and subsidized imports on the domestic 
industry concerned. 
4. Whether the United States violated the 
AD and SCM Agreements by (a) failing to 
demonstrate a causal relationship between 
the dumped and subsidized imports and the 
injury to the domestic industry, and (b) fail-
ing to examine known factors other than 
the dumped and subsidized imports which 
were injuring the domestic industry and fur-
ther failing to ensure that the i~uries 
caused by these other factors were not 
attributed to the dumped and subsidized 
imports. 
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APPENDIX III 
PARALLEL UNFAIR TRADE REMEDY CAsES BROUGHT UNDER CANADA-
US ITA CHAPTER 19 AND AT GAIT 
Canada-US ITA Chapter 19 Panels GAIT Dispute Settlement Panels 
FRESH, CHILLED AND FROZEN PORK UNITED STATES - COUNTERVAILING 
FROM CANADA, USA-89-1904-06 (Depart- DUTIES ON FRESH, CHILLED AND FRO-
ment of Commerce Countervailing Duty ZEN PORK FROM CANADA, DS7/R, 38S/ 
Determination) 30 
Request for panel review filed Aug. 1989; Request for establishment of panel filed by 
panel decisions issued Sept. 28, 1990; Mar. Canada Dec. 1989; Panel Report adopted 
8, 1991 July 11, 1991 
Core Issues: Core Issue: 
1. Whether subsidies provided to swine pro- 1. Whether the United States acted consist-
ducers confer benefits on pork processors. ently with GAIT Article V1:3 when it deter-
2. Whether the program benefits are mined that a subsidy had been bestowed on 
targeted to a specific enterprise, industry, or the production of pork equal to the full 
group of enterprises or industries. amount of the subsidy granted to producers 
of swine based solely on the findings that 
the demand for swine is substantially depen-
dent on the demand for pork and that 
processing of swine into pork adds only lim-
ited value. 
CERTAIN SOFTWOOD LUMBER PROD- UNITED STATES - MEASURES AFFECT-
UCTS FROM CANADA, USA-92-1904-01 ING IMPORTS OF SOFTWOOD LUMBER 
(Department of Commerce Countervailing FROM CANADA, SCM/162 
Duty Detennination) 
Request for the establishment of a panel 
Request for panel review filed May 1992; filed by Canada Dec. 1991; Panel Report 
panel decisions issued May 6, 1993; Dec. 17, adopted Oct. 27, 1993 
1993 
Core Issues: 
Core Issues: 1. Whether stumpage programs were spe-
1. Whether the stumpage programs confer cific. 
benefits on a specific group of industries. 2. Whether stumpage programs conferred a 
benefit at preferential rates. 
2. Whether the stumpage programs provide 3. Whether natural resource pricing prac-
timber to Canadian softwood lumber pro- tices could be subsidies subject to counter-
ducers at preferential rates. vailing duty measures. 
4. Whether there was sufficient evidence of 
the existence of a subsidy to justifY the initi-
ation by the United States of a counter-
vailing duty investigation. 
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CERTAIN SOFIWOOD LUMBER PROD-
UCTS FROM CANADA, USA-92-1904-01 
(Department of Commerce Countervailing 
Duty Determination) 
Request for panel review filed May 1992; 
panel decisions issued May 6, 1993; Dec. 17, 
1993 
Core Issues: 
1. Whether the stumpage programs confer 
benefits on a specific group of industries. 
2. Whether the stumpage programs provide 
timber to Canadian softwood lumber pro-
ducers at preferential rates. 
UNITED STATES - MEASURES AFFECT-
ING IMPORTS OF SOFIWOOD LUMBER 
FROM CANADA, SCM/162 
Request for the establishment of a panel 
filed by Canada Dec. 1991; Panel Report 
adopted Oct. 27, 1993 
Core Issues: 
1. Whether stumpage programs were spe-
cific. 
2. Whether stumpage programs conferred a 
benefi t at preferen tial rates. 
3. Whether natural resource pricing prac-
tices could be subsidies subject to counter-
vailing duty measures. 
4. Whether there was sufficient evidence of 
the existence of a subsidy to justifY the initi-
ation by the United States of a counter-
vailing duty investigation. 
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